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When Will the Smoke Clear?:




Waiver is generally referred to as the voluntary (or intentional)
relinquishment of a known right.2 Estoppel does not involve the intentional
relinquishment of a right, but rather, involves action (intentional or
unintentional) by one party inducing another party to rely on that action? In
insurance law cases, the doctrines of waiver and estoppel are frequently confused
and often used interchangeably.4 On April 13, 1999, the Missouri Supreme
Court added to the confusion through its application of a rule that "finds its
roots"5 in the doctrines of waiver and estoppel.6
Generally, insurance law states that "an [insurance company ("insurer")],
having denied liability on a specified ground, may not thereafter deny liability
on a different ground."7 In Missouri, to gain the benefit of this rule, an insurance
policyholder ("insured") must show (1) that the insurer expressly waived its right
to deny liability on a different ground at a later time, (2) that the insurer
conducted itself in a way that clearly and unequivocally showed a purpose by the
insurer to relinquish its right to deny liability on a different ground at a later time
(i.e., an implied waiver), or (3) that the insurer, initially denying liability on one
ground and then subsequently denying liability on a different ground, would
1. 988 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1999).
2. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw § 25E(a), at 148 (2d
ed. 1996); see also 1 EUGENE R. ANDERSON ET AL., INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION
§ 3.6, at 130 (1997); ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE
TO FUNDAmNTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COmMERCIAL PRACTICES § 6.1,
at 617 (Student ed., 1988); BARRYR. OSTRAGER &THOAS R.NEWMN, HANDBOOKON
INSURANCE COVERAGE DIsPUTES § 2.06(a), at 70 (9th ed. 1998); JEFFREY 1. STMauEL,
LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES § 5.01, at 5-3 (2d ed. 1999); 1 ALLAN D.
WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS & DISPUTES: REPRESENTATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES
AND INSUREDS § 2.25, at 84 (3d ed. 1995 & Supp. 1998).
3. See OSTRAGER &NEWAN, supra note 2, § 2.06(b), at 72; see also JERRY, supra
note 2, § 25E, at 148; KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 2, § 6.1, at 617-18; STEMPLF, supra
note 2, § 5.02, at 5-8. See generally WINDT, supra note 2, § 6.33, at 461-62.
4. See KEETON & WDISS, supra note 2, § 6.1, at 617; see also STE.PLE, supra note
2, § 5.01, at 5-3 ("The terms waiver and estoppel are often used interchangeably but
erroneously by courts, counsel, adjustors, and claimants.").
5. Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 776 S.W.2d 384,386 (Mo. 1989).
6. See Shahan, 988 S.W.2d at 529.
7. Brown, 776 S.W.2d at 386 (quoting Stone v. Waters, 483 S.W.2d 639,645 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1972)); see also ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 3.8, at 133-34.
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prejudice the insured! In the traditional application of this rule, prejudice under
the third prong was presumed by the announcement of a specific defense in that
the insured was prepared to meet that defense, and not the subsequent defense.9
After the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Shahan v. Shahan, however,
prejudice under this general rule is no longer presumed.
What is interesting about the court's decision in Shahan is the approach the
court used to achieve the desired result. In insurance law, generally, a court
cannot use the doctrines of waiver and estoppel to create coverage where
coverage did not previously exist under the express terms of the insurance
policy.'" The court in Shahan, notwithstanding Missouri's adherence to the
majority approach, underwent an analysis of a rule that was based on waiver and
estoppel despite the fact that a favorable ruling for the insured would contradict
the general principle that estoppel and waiver cannot be used to create coverage.
Because the majority failed to adhere to the traditional application of the rule and
presume prejudice when an insurer denies liability on one ground and
subsequently tries to deny liability on a different ground,'1 contradiction of the
general principle that waiver and estoppel cannot create coverage would have to
wait for another day. Under Shahan, however, one could argue that creating
coverage through waiver and estoppel is not prohibited in Missouri; but
unfortunately for insureds in Missouri, proving waiver and estoppel after Shahan
will not be an easy task.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1991, Andrew Shahan ("Andrew") was injured in an automobile accident
involving a pickup truck driven by his half brother, Todd Shahan ("Todd"). 2 At
the time of the accident, Andrew was riding in the back of the truck; the injury
occurred when negligent operation of the truck caused the truck to leave the
roadway, hit a ditch, and overturn twice.' The owner of the vehicle, Leo
Hunolt, carried two insurance policies on the pickup: (1) an automobile
insurance policy with bodily injury coverage of up to $100,000, and (2) an
umbrella liability policy with a $1,000,000 limit.' 4  State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance ("State Farm") issued both policies to Nancy and Leo
8. See Brown, 776 S.W.2d at 388.
9. Id. at 389.
10. See JERRY, supra note 2, § 61(a), at 344.
11. See Shahan v. Shahan, 988 S.W.2d 529,533-35 (Mo. 1999).
12. See Shahan v. Shahan, Nos. WD53825, WD53826, 1998 WL 169776, at *1
(Mo. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 1998).
13. Id.
14. Shahan, 988 S.W.2d at 532.
[Vol. 66
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Hunolt, Andrew's mother and stepfather respectively. 5 At the time of the
accident, Andrew was residing with the Hunolts. 6
As next friend for Andrew, Nancy Hunolt filed an action for personal
injuries against Todd in March 1992." In November 1992, State Farm filed a
declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend
Todd! 8 State Farm argued that Todd was not a permissive user, and therefore,
was not an "insured" under the automobile policy." The declaratory judgment
court, however, found that Todd was a permissive user and that State Farm had
a duty to defend.2" The personal injury action then proceeded in the Circuit
Court of Adair County, the trial court of Judge Bruce Normile.2 '
In August 1995, State Farm filed a motion to withdraw from the personal
injury action as counsel for Todd, asserting that the household exclusions in both
policies precluded Andrew from recovering' Judge Normile initially denied
15. Id.





21. See Shahan v. Shahan, Nos. WD53835, WD53826, 1998 WVL 169776, at *1
(Mo. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 1998).
22. Id. The household exclusion in the personal liability umbrella policy excluded
coverage "'[flor personal injury to the named insured, spouse, or anyone within the
meaning ofpart a. orb. ofthe definition of insured."' Id. at *2. The policy's definition
section states:
5. 'insured' means:
a. the named insured;
b. the following residents of the named insured's household:
1. the named insured's relatives; and
2. anyone under the age of 21 under the care of a person named above.
7. 'named insured' means the person named in the Declarations and the
spouse.
13. 'relative' means any person related by blood, adoption, or marriage to the
named insured.
Id The household exclusion in the automobile insurance policy excluded coverage "[flor
any bodily injury to... any insured or any member of an insured's family residing in the
insured's household." Id. at *5 (emphasis omitted).
The automobile insurance policy defined "insured" as:
1. you;
2. your spouse;
3. the relatives of the first person named in the declaration;
4. any other person while using such a car if its use is within the scope of
2001]
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State Farm's motion and issued an order stating that the household exclusion in
the automobile policy did not apply to Andrew.' Subsequently, State Farm was
allowed to withdraw as counsel even though Judge Normile had not changed his
view that the household exclusion did not apply.'
Andrew was awarded a judgment in the amount of $225,000.25 Andrew
then filed a "Request and Order for Execution/Garnishment" naming State Farm
as the Garnishee.26 The garnishment court concluded that Judge Normile's
previous determination that the household exclusion in the automobile insurance
policy did not apply to Andrew was "law of the case" and ordered State Farm to
pay the policy limit for the automobile policy.'
On appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court,28 State Farm argued that the
garnishment court erred in determining that the household exclusion in the
automobile insurance policy did not apply to Andrew.29 In response to this
assertion, Andrew claimed that the doctrines of collateral estoppel, res judicata,
law of the case, waiver, and estoppel precluded consideration of whether the
household exclusion did or did not apply.30 The court held that State Farm's
actions in the declaratory judgment action and Judge Normile's ruling in the
personal injury action in response to State Farm's motion to withdraw did not
consent of you or your spouse; and
5. any other person or organization liable for the use of such a car by one of
the above insureds.
Id. In accordance with Missouri's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law
('MVFRA"), State Farm tendered $25,000 to the court registry before filing the motion
for leave to withdraw. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 303.010-.370 (1994); Shahan v. Shahan,
988 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Mo. 1999); see also Halpin v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 823
S.W.2d 479, 482-83 (Mo. 1992) (holding that the exclusionary provisions in insurance
policies did not apply to the limits of liability imposed by Sections 303.010-.370).
23. Shahan, 988 S.W.2d at 532.
24. Id. The dissent asserted that the motion to withdraw was granted only "when
State Farm made clear to the court that it would no longer pay for counsel's time, even
if the court required him personally to continue to defend Todd Shahan." Id. at 538.
25. Id. at 532.
26. Id.
27. Id. The garnishment court judge, Judge Lewis, also concluded that Andrew
could not recover under the umbrella policy. Id. Andrew was both under twenty-one and
in the care of a "named insured" within the meaning of the policy definition. See Shahan
v. Shahan, Nos. WD53825, WD53826, 1998 WL 169776, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. Apr. 14,
1998). For the relevant text of the household exclusion in the umbrella policy, see supra
note 22.
28. A motion for transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court was sustained on August
25, 1998 after a previous denial. See Shahan, 1998 WL 169776, at * 1.
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preclude an examination of the household exclusion in the automobile policy.'
After a determination that the court could consider the household exclusion, the
court held that the household exclusions of both policies barred coverage?'
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The court in Shahan faced arguments based on collateral estoppel, res
judicata, law of the case, waiver, and estoppel. The arguments involving
collateral estoppel, res judicata, and law of the case, however, were easily
dismissed by the majority opinion and the majority's analysis as to these
arguments was not disputed in the dissent 3 Thus, this Note will focus on the
law of waiver and estoppel in insurance cases, and Missouri courts'
interpretation of the relevant household exclusion in the automobile policy.'
A. Waiver and Estoppel in Insurance Law and
Missouri's Application of the Two Doctrines
Waiver and estoppel are distinct legal theories.3 However, application of
both doctrines interchangeably has led to confusion in the law. Waiver
involves the intentional relinquishment of a known right and may be either
expressed or implied. Generally, negligence or mistake provide insufficient
grounds for finding a waiver.38 An express waiver could be made through a
statement or letter by the insurer. For example, the statement "under the policy,
we have the right to refuse your proof of loss because it's late, but given your
continued business with our company, we agree to consider it" would be strong
31. Id. at 534-35.
32. Id. at 529.
33. See id. at 532. For a brief discussion of the rules governing collateral estoppel,
resjudicata, and law of the case, see infra notes 110-12.
34. It should be noted that Andrew also placed the lower court's interpretation of
the household exclusion in the umbrella liability policy at issue; the majority's
interpretation of that exclusion was not disputed in the dissent, however. Therefore,
further discussion of that policy exclusion will be omitted. See Shahan, 988 S.V.2d at
536.
35. See Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 776 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Mo.
1989).
36. See supra note 4; see also STEMPLE, supra note 2, § 5.01, at 5-3 ('The
commingling and confusion is to some extent inevitable: both doctrines assert that an
insurer or its agents has acted in such a manner as to forfeit an otherwise valid defense
to coverage.").
37. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
38. See JERRY, supra note 2, § 25E, at 148.
2001]
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evidence of an express waiver.39 Implicit waiver, on the other hand, can occur
through conduct by the insurer. For example, the court may imply a waiver
when the insurer accepts a premium with full knowledge that the insured has
already breached a warranty in the policy.4" Occasionally, courts will take a
broad view of implicit waiver in favor of the less powerful insured.4' In
Companion Life Insurance Co. v. Whitesell Manufacturing, Inc.,42 for example,
the court held the insurer's initial litigation responses worked as evidence that
the insurer had impliedly waived its right to forced arbitration.43 Although
usually the insurer's silence is insufficient to imply a waiver, there may be
circumstances where, in all fairness the insurer should communicate with the
insured about a situation. Under those circumstances, the court may imply a
waiver despite the insurer's silence. 44
Unlike waiver, estoppel does not involve the intentional relinquishment of
a right by the insurer. Rather, in estoppel, the insurer simply has taken some
action and the insured has relied on that action to his detriment. 45 Although it is
recognized that estoppel takes on more than one form,"' when insurance cases
refer to "estoppel" and nothing more, they are generally referring to the doctrine
of equitable estoppel.47 To establish equitable estoppel in the insurance law
39. See STEMPLE, supra note 2, § 5.01, at 5-4.
40. See JERRY, supra note 2, § 25E(b), at 148.
41. See Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 776 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Mo.
1989).
42. 670 So. 2d 897 (Ala. 1995).
43. See STEMPLE, supra note 2, § 5.01, at 5-4 & n.6.
44. See JERRY, supra note 2, § 25E(b), at 148-49.
45. See OSTRAGER &NEWMAN, supra note 2, § 2.06(b), at 72; see also KEETON &
WIDISS, supra note 2, § 6.1, at 618 (arguing that intent should be irrelevant in
establishing estoppel). Estoppel, according to Keeton and Widiss, is based instead on
"the nature of either the insurer's actions or the effect of the insurer's actions on the
insured." KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 2, § 6.1, at 618.
46. See STEMPLE, supra note 2, § 5.02, at 5-8 to 5-9. Stemple takes on a discussion
of both promissory and equitable estoppel. The difference between the two, according
to Stemple, lies in the nature of the remedy provided for by each kind of estoppel. See
STEMPLE, supra note 2, § 5.02, at 5-8 to 5-9. Whereas equitable estoppel will provide
for enforcement of the underlying contract or preclusion of enforcement of a contract
term, promissory estoppel creates a new or modified contract. See STEMPLE, supra note
2, § 5.02, at 5-8 to 5-9.
47. See STEMPLE, supra note 2, § 5.03, at 5-11. This observation correlates with
the general principle that "while waiver or estoppel may bar a defense to a right the
insured once had, such will not create a new coverage or rights not found in the contract."
Macalco, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 883, 891 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). As noted
earlier, promissory estoppel would create new coverage if applied to insurance cases. See
STEMPLE, supra note 2, § 5.02, at 5-8 to 5-9.
[Vol. 66
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context, the insured must show "(1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent
with the claim afterwards asserted [by the insurer] ... (2) action by [the insured]
on the faith of such admission, statement, or act, and (3) injury to [the insured],
resulting from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate the admission,
statement, or act.'" Generally, it is not necessary for an insurer to intentionally
mislead the insured or for the insurer to have knowledge of the true facts for an
insured to establish estoppel; however, a minority of courts have made intent to
mislead an element of estoppel.49 Admittedly, when intent is made an element
of estoppel, the difference between implied waiver and estoppel is difficult to
discern."
Even in a majority jurisdiction, however, (where intent to mislead is not an
element of estoppel), drawing the distinction between waiver and estoppel has
not been an easy task for courts."5 With that stated, two pertinent differences
between waiver and estoppel (in a majority jurisdiction) are worth reiterating
from the discussion above: (1) generally, estoppel does not involve an intent by
the insurer to mislead, and (2) waiver does not require a showing that the
insured was prejudiced.' Keeping these distinctions in mind, it is safe to
proceed to a discussion of some of the rules that have evolved involving waiver
and estoppel in insurance law.
One example of a rule based on waiver or estoppel is the principle that an
insurer, having undertaken the insured's defense without a reservation of rights,
is precluded from raising any policy defense that it had notice of at the time it
assumed the insured's defense.54 This rule was illustrated in Safeco Insurance
48. Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 776 S.W.2d 384,386 (Mo. 1989)
(quoting Mississippi-Fox Drainage Dist. of Clark County v. Plenge, 735 S.W2d 748,
754 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)).
49. See STEMPLE, supra note 2, § 5.03, at 5-16 to 5-17.
50. See generally STEMPLE, supra note 2, § 5.03, at 5-14 ("Because the waiver is
so often implied rather than express, this prompts many to mischaracterize the decision
as flowing from equitable estoppel"). Stemple distinguishes implied waiver and
equitable estoppel in the following statement: "Despite the implicit nature of the
insurer's conduct, if the insurer appears to know of a right and to hme voluntarily passed
up a chance to enforce it, the insurer can be held to have waived that right.' STEMPLF,
supra note 2, § 5.03, at 5-14 (emphasis added). In ajurisdiction that requires kmowledge
or the intent to mislead to establish estoppel, however, Stemple's explanation sheds little
light on the difference between implied waiver and equitable estoppel.
51. See generally Brown, 776 S.V.2d at 388 (finding frustration in the law of
waiver and estoppel).
52. See STEMPLE, supra note 2, at § 5.03, at 5-16 to 5-17.
53. See Brown, 776 S.W.2d at 388 ("Prejudice plays no part in long-accepted
definitions of waiver.").
54. See OSTRAGER & NEwMAN, supra note 2, § 2.02, at 45; see also Shahan v.
Shahan, 988 S.W.2d 529,537 (Mo. 1999) (citations omitted) ('In Missouri, as elsewhere,
2001]
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Co. ofAmerica v. Stone & Sons, Inc.,5 where the court stated in dicta that the
insurer had lost any claim that the policy had been cancelled by the mailing of
a cancellation notice when it undertook and maintained for eighteen months the
exclusive defense of a lawsuit against the insured.56 The court expressed the
reasoning behind the rule in the following statement:
By assuming its policy right to control the defense of the lawsuit,
Safeco precluded its insured from undertaking its own defense and
from attempting to negotiate an amicable settlement at the early stages
of the litigation. This is sufficient prejudice to estop Safeco from
asserting the cancellation of the policy under the terms of which it
continued to act.57
It is unclear which of the two doctrines that the rule illustrated by Safeco is based
on. Conceivably, this rule could be based on the doctrine of estoppel. 8
However, the insurer generally must know of defenses to coverage at the time
it undertook the defense in order for this rule to apply. The requirement of
knowledge by the insurer would lead one to believe that, in a majority of
jurisdictions, this rule is primarily applied through the doctrine of waiver.59
Another important rule involving waiver and estoppel in insurance cases
states that "an insurer, having denied liability on a specified ground, may not
thereafter deny liability on a different ground."' Typically, this rule is applied
it is the rule that an insurer, with knowledge of facts that would give rise to a defense of
noncoverage, who nevertheless undertakes to defend an insured without a reservation of
rights, is generally estopped from raising such a defense subsequently."). "Reservation
of rights," it has been stated, "is a means by which prior to determination of liability of
the insured, the insurer seeks to suspend the operation of waiver and estoppel."
OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 2, § 2.02, at 45.
55. 822 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
56. Id. at 569.
57. Id.
58. A minority ofjurisdictions makes knowledge by the insurer and/or intent to
mislead an element of estoppel. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. In a
jurisdiction justifying this rule on estoppel grounds, the insured will have to show
prejudice. See generally Mendel v. Home Ins. Co., 806 F. Supp. 1206, 1215 (E.D. Pa.
1992) ("[I]n the context of an insurer's failure to assert all possible defenses to coverage,
the [Pennsylvania] courts apply an estoppel only when there is actual prejudice.").
Indeed, because the Safeco opinion discussed why there was prejudice, it is likely that
the Safeco court believed that the rule was based on estoppel. See Safeco, 822 S.W.2d
at 569.
59. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
60. Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 776 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Mo. 1989)
(quoting Stone v. Waters, 483 S.W.2d 639, 645 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972)); see also
[Vol. 66
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in situations where an insurer fails to mention a specific defense in the initial
disclaimer.6' For example, in Kammeyer v. Concordia Telephone Co.,' the
insurer initially denied coverage because the policy excluded coverage for
injuries arising out of "completed operations" of the insured. Later on, at a
garnishment proceeding, the insurer attempted to deny coverage because the
policy only covered the partnership and did not insure the operations of a
business conducted by an individual.' The court held that the insurer could not
raise the subsequent denial of coverage because the original denial was made
with full knowledge of the facts. Furthermore, the court stated that an insurer
"having denied coverage on a specified ground... may not thereafter deny
coverage on a different ground."'
According to the Missouri Supreme Court, the rule relied on in Kammeyer
"finds its roots" in the doctrines of waiver and estoppel.' Not surprisingly, the
Missouri Supreme Court has limited the reach of this rule by stating "in the
absence of either (1) an express waiver by the insurer or (2) conduct which
clearly and unequivocally shows a purpose by the insurer to relinquish a
contractual right [i.e., an implied waiver], the insured must show prejudice
before the rule may be invoked."'  Generally, prejudice is presumed by the
announcement of a specific defense in that the plaintiff has prepared to meet that
defense, and not the subsequent defense. However, some courts have required
a showing of additional prejudice.69
ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 3.8, at 133-34.
61. See ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 3.8, at 133. Application of waiver and estoppel
when an insurer denies on a specific ground and subsequently denies on a different
ground, however, should not be limited to situations involving disclaimer letters. There
is authority that states that a declaratory judgment action is the equivalent of a disclaimer.
See generally OSTRAGER & NENAN, supra note 2, § 2.05(b), at 63 (noting that
according to New York law, a declaratory judgment action fulfills the insurer's obligation
to disclaim liability).
62. 446 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
63. Id. at 488.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 490.
66. See Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 776 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Mo.
1989).
67. Id at 388. Therefore, the rule in Missouri actually reads as follows: an insurer,
having denied liability on a specified ground, absent an express or implied waiver of
rights, can deny liability on a different ground as long as the insured will not be
prejudiced by the different denial.
68. Id at 389.
69. Ostrager and Newman stated:
The cases which hold that an insurer waives the right to disclaim coverage for
reasons other than those specifically identified in the original disclaimer letter
2001]
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Coexisting with the rule that an insurer cannot initially deny liability on one
ground and then subsequently deny liability on a different ground is the general
principle that one cannot use waiver and estoppel to create coverage for risks
that are not found in the express terms of the insurance contract.70 Facially, this
principle seems to contradict the rule that an insurer having denied liability on
one ground cannot thereafter deny liability on a different ground.7 ' The majority
of courts, however, have mitigated this contradiction by only precluding an
insurer from raising those defenses based on the policy's conditions of forfeiture
if they had previously denied the claim on a different basis, and have not
precluded defenses that go to coverage.72
cannot always be reconciled with the concept of waiver as the voluntary and
intentional relinquishment of a known right .... Thus, a number of courts
have held that an insurer's failure to include in its disclaimer letter all possible
grounds for disclaimer will create a waiver or estoppel only where the insured
is able to show some prejudice resulting from the omission.
OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 2, § 2.05(b), at 67.
70. See JERRY, supra note 2, § 61(a), at 344. There are a minority ofjurisdictions
that do not follow this rule. See JERRY, supra note 2, § 61(a), at 345-46. Missouri,
however, follows the majority approach. See Young v. Ray Am., Inc., 673 S.W.2d 74,
80 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that waiver and estoppel cannot be used to extend the
coverage of an insurance policy); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. of
Milwaukee, 581 S.W.2d 596, 601 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (noting that waiver or estoppel
may bar a defense to a right the insured once had, but they will not create a new coverage
or grant a right not found in the contract).
71. To illustrate, consider the following "hypothetical": An insurer initially denies
liability because the insured is not a permissive user. Subsequently the insurer raises the
defense that the insured fell under the household exclusion. If the rule, i.e., that an
insurer cannot subsequently deny a claim on a different basis if they had already asserted
a specific denial, does not allow the insurer to raise the household exclusion (assuming
the insured actually fell within that exclusion) then a law that was created from waiver
and estoppel is allowing those doctrines to create coverage where it did not previously
exist under the policy. See generally Beth C. Boggs, Just Say No: Avoiding the Pitfalls
in Denial of Coverage, 52 J. Mo. B. 110, 111 (1996).
72. See id. at 112 ("In most states, estoppel will only apply to the policy's stated
conditions of forfeiture, such as notice requirement, without affecting valid policy
exclusions which were not set forth initially."); see also WINDT, supra note 2, § 2.25, at
85 ("In accordance with the general rule ... that policy coverage cannot be created or
enlarged by waiver, those courts have held that an insurance company's declination of
coverage cannot constitute a waiver of any unmentioned defense that is based on a policy
exclusion or on the terms of the insuring clause."); WINDT, supra note 2, § 2.24, at 22 (3d
ed. Supp. 1998) (citing Waller v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 900 P.2d 619 (1995),
modified on other grounds, 11 Cal. 4th 453a (1995) for the proposition that thirty-two
out of thirty-three states to consider the issue agree that "[a]n insurer does not impliedly
waive coverage defenses it fails to mention when it denies the claim").
[Vol. 66
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The distinction between defenses involving conditions of forfeiture and
defenses involving coverage can be illustrated by an examination of the
following cases. InMacalo, Inc. v. GulfInsurance Co.,' the insurance policy
at issue did not provide coverage for student pilots. The agent for the insurer,
however, listed a student pilot in the pilot clause, representing to the insurer that
the pilot had been certified when in fact he was only a student.74 The court in
Macalco did not allow the misrepresentation defense and required the insurer to
provide coverage to the listed pilot because that was the coverage afforded under
the policy.75 The court found that the insurance agent was responsible for the
misrepresentation and that the insurer could not avoid coverage because of this
condition of forfeiture.?6 Macalco can be contrasted with Young v. RayAmerica,
Inc.' In Young, the insureds argued that an insurance policy they were issued
covered a corporation of which they were the sole shareholders.73 The
corporation, however, was not listed as a named insured. 9 The court refused to
extend coverage to the corporation reasoning that "[t]o require the insurance
company to provide coverage for an entity other than the named insured would
have the effect of providing coverage where none existed under the policy's own
terms."0 The distinction between defenses involving conditions of forfeiture
and defenses as to coverage is a fine distinction that can easily become blurred.8'
Professor Robert Jerry has argued that in many cases, courts have defined
"forfeiture provision" in such a way that the "ability of estoppel to broaden
coverage is virtually unbounded."'
In Missouri, for example, failure to narrowly draw the distinction between
forfeiture provisions and coverage provisions has increased the likelihood that
a court will use estoppel to create coverage, and has added much confusion to
the application of waiver and estoppel rules in insurance cases.' Stone v.
Waters illustrates Missouri's precedent. In Stone, the insurer's sole ground of
73. 550 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
74. Id. at 887.
75. Id at 887-88.
76. Id. at 888.
77. 673 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
78. Id. at 80.
79. d
80. Id.
81. See JERRY, supra note 2, § 61(a), at 346-47 ("Yet courts have long used
estoppel to prevent insurers from asserting forfeiture provisions in situations where the
insured has breached, and this is tantamount to insisting that an insurer reimburse a loss
it did not plan to cover and for which it presumably collected no premium.").
82. JERRY, supra note 2, § 61(a), at 347.
83. See generally BOGGS, supra note 71, at 11.
84. 483 S.W.2d 639 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
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denial initially was that the defendant was not a named insured because he did
not reside in the same household as the policyholder. 5 At trial, however, the
insurer attempted to assert the additional defense that the automobile in question
was not listed on the insurance schedule. 6 The Missouri Court of Appeals for
the Western District of Missouri held that the additional defense was precluded
because the insurer had previously denied coverage on a specific ground, i.e.,
that the defendant was not a named insured.87 Arguably, this holding implies
that, in Missouri, courts will not limit their use of waiver and estoppel to
preclude only those defenses based on conditions of forfeiture. Rather, Missouri
courts will use waiver and estoppel to preclude all defenses to coverage.88
B. The Household Exclusion
The relevant household exclusion in Shahan in the automobile insurance
policy excludes coverage for "any bodily injury to ... any insured or any
member of an insured's family residing in the insured's household."89 The
insurance policy defines "insured" as:
1. you [the named insured or insureds];
2. your spouse;
3. the relatives of the first person named in the declarations;
4. any other person while using such car if its use is within the scope
of consent of your spouse;
85. Id. at 642.
86. Id. at 645.
87. Id.
88. Some Missouri authority would disagree; those courts have distinguished Stone
by asserting that Stone involved a "defense" to coverage for what otherwise was a
covered risk, and that cases not allowing waiver or estoppel to preclude a defense by an
insurer all involve "express exclusions of coverage for certain risks or policies which
unambiguously do not provide coverage for certain risks." Safeco Ins. Co. v. Marion,
676 F. Supp. 197, 200 (E.D. Mo. 1987); see also Lawrence v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 649
S.W.2d 461, 465 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). It is difficult to perceive, however, how the
policy could have "less ambiguously" excluded coverage for vehicles not listed on the
schedule in Stone. Furthermore, subsequent Missouri Supreme Court authority that
involves express exclusions has undergone a waiver/estoppel analysis, despite the
possibility that a favorable ruling for the insured would enlarge coverage through the
application of the two doctrines. See Shahan v. Shahan, 988 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1999).
The Missouri Supreme Court avoided creating coverage through waiver and estoppel,
however, by failing to find either (1) an express waiver, (2) an implied waiver, or (3)
prejudice to the insured in the facts of Shahan. See id. at 534 & n.1.
89. Shahan, 988 S.W.2d at 535.
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5. any other person or organization liable for the use of such a car by
one of the above insureds.!0
The policy defines "relative" as "a person related to you or your spouse by
blood, marriage or adoption who lives with you."'
Missouri courts have interpreted this policy language on more than one
occasion and the Missouri Supreme Court has declared this language to be
unambiguous.93 The following will trace the evolution of the courts'
interpretation of this policy exclusion and explain the courts' reasoning in
construing the relevant language.
In State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co. v. Carney,' the Missouri
Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri was asked to interpret the
exclusion at issue. In Carney, the injured party was a passenger in ajeep driven
by her husband.95 The injured party's husband was "an insured" under the
policy language because he was given permission to drive the jeep by the
policyholder.95 The insurer, State Farm, argued that the injured party was
excluded from coverage because she was a member of "an insured's" (her
husband's) family residing in "the insured's" (her husband's) household.' The
court in Carney recognized that whether the policy language at issue was
ambiguous was a matter of first impression in Missouri. The court held that the
language was ambiguous and that a court could read the language "any member
of an insured's family residing in the insured's household" two ways: (1) a
narrow reading that limited "the insured" to the named policyholder (and
therefore requiring that the injured party reside with the policyholder in order to
fall under the exclusion), or (2) a broader reading where "the insured" was
simply referring to "an insured" or, in other words, the specific category of
"insured" that applies to the situation. Accordingly, the Carney court construed
the exclusion against State Farm.'
90. Id
91. Id.
92. See Shahan, 988 S.W.2d at 529; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ballmer,
899 S.W.2d 523 (Mo. 1995); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Carney, 861 S.W.2d 665
(Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
93. See Ballraer, 899 S.W.2d at 526 (overruling Carney, 861 S.W.2d at 665).
94. 861 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
95. Id. at 666.
96. Id One of the categories of"an insured" is "any other person while using such
a car if its use is within the scope of consent of you or your spouse." Id.
97. Id. at 668.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 668-69.
100. Id. at 669 ("Insurance is designed to furnish, not defeat, protection to the
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Carney's holding that the relevant policy exclusion was ambiguous was
short lived. In 1995, the Missouri Supreme Court decided State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Ballmer,"'0 and not only held that the exclusion was
not ambiguous,"2 but a unanimous court agreed to give the exclusion a broad
interpretation. 0 3 Facing facts that were indistinguishable from Carney,' the
court reasoned that "because there are five categories included in the definition
of 'insured,' the definite article 'the' is used in the household exclusion to refer
to the specific category of 'insured' that applies to the situation."'0 5 Applying
this interpretation, the court found that the loss was excluded because the injured
party (the half-brother of the driver) was a member of "an insured's" (the
permissive driver's) family residing in "the insured's" (in this case, the
permissive driver, his half-brother's) household. 6
Ballmer, however, was not the last time Missouri courts were asked to
clarify the possible ambiguities in this policy exclusion. 7
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Shahan, the insured bombarded the Missouri Supreme Court with
numerous legal theories in an attempt to preclude any analysis of the household
exclusion inhis automobile policy. Because of the number of theories presented,
the opinion did not address any single doctrine in great detail; rather, the court
took on a mini-analysis of all of the insured's arguments.' The following will
focus primarily on the issues that were contested in the dissent, i.e., the
application of waiver and estoppel and the court's interpretation of the household
exclusion in the automobile insurance policy.
insured, and the insurance company is in the best position to remove ambiguity from the
contract.").
101. 899 S.W.2d 523 (Mo. 1995).
102. Id. at 526. Needless to say, the court in Ballmer took a different approach to
the policy exclusion than the court in Carney did. Where the Carney court started with
the principle that ambiguous policy provisions are construed against the drafter, the
Ballmer court premised its analysis with the following: "[i]f a term within an insurance
policy is clearly defined, the contract definition controls." Id. at 525-26 (citing McManus
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 583 S.W.2d 271, 272 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979)).
103. Id. at 526.
104. Id. at 524. In Ballmer, the permissive driver ("an insured") was the half-
brother of the injured party; the driver and the half-brother lived together. Id.
105. Id. at 526.
106. Id.
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A. The Majority Opinion
At the beginning of the majority opinion, the court in Shahan recognized
that before they could examine the exclusion in the automobile policy, the court
would have to address Andrew's claims that the doctrines of collateral estoppel,
resjudicata, law of the case, waiver, and estoppel precluded examination of the
relevant household exclusion.'
The court disposed of Andrew's collateral estoppel,"' res judicata,"I and
law of the case arguments with little effort." The court then turned to Andrew's
argument that State Farm had waived the household exclusion defense or, in the
alternative, that State Farm was estopped from asserting that the household
exclusion applied in this case." 3 Noting that estoppel is the preferred theory
when an insurer employs a policy defense, the majority analyzed Andrew's
estoppel arguments first. 1
4
109. Id. at 532-33.
110. Id. at 533. In determining whether collateral estoppel is applicable, courts
should consider:
(1) whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the
issue presented in the present action; (2) whether the prior adjudication
resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) whether the party against whom
collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or was in privity with a party to the
prior adjudication; and (4) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel
is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior suit.
Id. at 532-33 (citing Oates v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 583 S.V.2d 713, 719 (Mo. 1979)).
Dismissing Andrew's collateral estoppel argument, the court in Shahan held that the
issues and the parties in the gamishment action and the personal injury action were
different that Judge Normile's ruling on the exclusion was not ajudgment on the merits,
and that State Farm did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate. Id. at 533.
111. Id Andrew's res judicata claim was dismissed, it seems, for the sole reason
that Andrew failed to undergo any res judicata analysis. Id. at 532-33.
112. Id. at 533. A decision of a court is generally considered the "law of the case"
for "all points presented and decided, as well as for matters that arose prior to the first
adjudication and might have been raised but were not." Id. (citing Valihan v. St. Louis-
Clayton Orthopedic Group, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 545,547 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)). The court
in Shahan decided that Judge Normile's initial determination that the household
exclusion did not apply was not the "lawv of the case" for the garnishment action because
State Farm was not a party to the personal injury case; further, the court held, State Farm
was not an aggrieved party ("it obtained from Judge Normile the relief it sought"), and
therefore, State Farm lacked standing to appeal. Id. at 533.
113. Id.
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Estoppel, according to the court, requires that an insurer "first announce a
specific defense and subsequently seek to rely instead on an inconsistent
theory."" 5 After setting forth this general rule, the majority elaborated on what
an insured must show in order to preclude an insurer from raising a subsequent
inconsistent defense. The court in Shahan set forth the following two
requirements: (1) an insurer's actions must induce the insured to rely on the
original defense and cause the insured injury, and (2) the insured must show that
he was prejudiced by the insurer's actions before the court may invoke
estoppel."' The majority then noted that an insured must show prejudice beyond
the "mere filing of a lawsuit" for estoppel to apply."' Applying these principles,
the majority held that estoppel did not assist Andrew.'" The court held that it
was not inconsistent for State Farm to raise the household exclusion defense in
the garnishment action because State Farm had argued the household exclusion
defense in its motion to withdraw as counsel in the personal injury action."9 For
Andrew to succeed in his estoppel argument, the court reasoned, "Andrew would
have to show that in the personal injury case, State Farm announced a specific
defense, then later in the garnishment action sought to rely upon an inconsistent
theory."'2 ° According to the majority, Andrew had not met this burden.12 1
115. Id. at 533-34 (quoting Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 776 S.W.2d
384, 388 (Mo. 1989)).
116. Id. at 534 (citing Brown, 776 S.W.2d at 388). This "elaboration," however,
is likely to muddle a reader's understanding of the doctrine of estoppel. The majority
treats "injury" and "prejudice" as if they were two distinct concepts. Id. Arguably, in
cases like Shahan, the injury, and therefore, prejudice occurs because the announcement
of a specific defense gives insufficient notice of other defenses. See generally Brown,
776 S.W.2d at 389. The insured needs preparation time to meet other defenses; hence,
the announcement of a specific defense causes the insured to rely to his detriment. Id.




120. Id. In a footnote, the majority addressed the dissent's argument that State
Farm's actions during the declaratory judgment action were grounds for estoppel. Id. at
534 n.1. The majority discarded the dissent's argument for two reasons: (1) Andrew
never argued that State Farm should be "estopped" because of its actions during the
declaratory judgment proceeding, and (2) even if the argument proceeded, the dissent did
not show how Andrew was prejudiced. Id. In that same footnote, the majority rebutted
the dissent's argument that State Farm was estopped from raising the household
exclusion because it undertook Todd's defense without a reservation of rights. The
majority criticized the dissent for merging the doctrines of waiver and estoppel under this
one argument. According to the majority, there was no waiver, and as discussed
previously, the court stated that Andrew had failed to establish the prejudice necessary
for estoppel. The dissent, in their opinion, argued that Andrew did not have to establish
[Vol. 66
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Furthermore, the court noted, estoppel in this case was inapplicable because
Andrew had not shown that State Farm's actions caused reliance, injury, or
prejudice."
The majority then addressed Andrew's arguments premised on the doctrine
of waiver." At the outset, the court defined waiver," and recognized that
waiver could be expressed or implied." s As to Andrew's argument, however,
the court found that State Farm's actions in seeking a declaratory judgment did
not constitute a waiver. Rather, when State Farm sought to declare that it did not
have a duty to defend Todd because Todd was not a permissive user of the
automobile, the court concluded that State Farm did not intend to relinquish its
right to raise the household exclusion."
The majority, having ruled against all of Andrew's arguments that the court
was precluded from examining the policy language, then went on to interpret the
household exclusion."z
At the outset of its interpretation, the majority noted that "[c]ourts are not
permitted to create ambiguities in order to distort the language of an
unambiguous policy."'" Furthermore, the court stated, "[w]hen interpreting the
language of an insurance contract, this Court gives the language its plain
meaning.'" The court then noted that the exclusion at issue excluded coverage
"for any bodily injury to... any insured or any member of an insured's family
residing in the insured's household."'3  Because the clause used the term "or '
that he was prejudiced; rather, because he "stands in Todd's shoes" in the garnishment
action, all Andrew needed to establish was that Todd was prejudiced. Id. The majority,
under the assumption that Andrew did "stand in Todd's shoes," addressed the dissent's
position, but failed to find that Todd was prejudiced. Id.
121. Id. at 534.
122. Id
123. Id.
124. Ia "Waiver... is 'the intentional relinquishment of a known right.'" Id.
(quoting Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 776 S.V.2d 384,386-87 (Mo. 1989)).
125. Id. (citing Brown, 776 S.W.2d at 3 86-87).
126. Id.
127. Id at 535.
128. Id (citing Rodriguez v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am, 808 S.W.2d 379, 382
(Mo. 1991)).
129. Id (citing Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co., 941 S.V.2d 505, 508
(Mo. 1997)).
130. Id
131. Md "The conjunction 'or' means 'an alternative between different or unlike
things, states, or actions."' Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEWv INTERNATiONAL
DICTIONARY 1585 (3d ed. 1993)).
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the plain language of the policy provided for two distinct exclusions. ' First, the
policy exclusion precluded coverage for "any insured," and second, the policy
exclusion precluded coverage for "any member of an insured's family residing
in the insured's household."'' Because Andrew was a relative of the first person
named in the declarations,M the court held that Andrew fell under the first
exclusion, i.e., "any insured," and therefore he was precluded from recovering
under the automobile insurance policy. 35
B. The Dissent
The dissent focused its arguments on the majority's application of waiver
and estoppel, and the majority's interpretation of the household exclusion in the
automobile policy.
Attacking the majority's arguments on waiver and estoppel, the dissent
expressed primary concern with the issue of what circumstances are sufficient
to show "prejudice" to the insured.136 The dissent argued that the majority was
mis-applying precedent to eliminate the traditional notion of prejudice used in
cases similar to Shahan.'37 Furthermore, the dissent argued that "the
announcement of a specific defense itself prejudices the claimant merely by
causing him or her to prepare to combat that particular defense and not
others."'38 In the case at issue, the dissent stated, State Farm initially denied
coverage to Todd by filing a declaratory judgment action asserting that he was
not a permissive user of the automobile.'39 Thus, the prejudice to Andrew
occurred when State Farm raised a completely different ground for denying
coverage in its motion to withdraw from the personal injury action. 4*
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. One of the definitions of "insured" was "the relatives of the first person named
in the declarations." Id. "Relative" was defined in the policy as "a person related to you
or your spouse by blood, marriage or adoption who lives with you." Id.
135. Id. The majority then addressed Andrew's appeal involving the umbrella
liability policy and upheld the trial court's determination that Andrew could not garnish
the proceeds of the umbrella policy with little discussion. See id. at 536.
136. See generally id. at 536-38.
137. Id. at 536-37 (arguing that the majority opinion misapplied the analysis used
in Brown v. State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co., 776 S.W.2d 384 (Mo. 1989)).
138. Id. at 537 (citing Brown, 776 S.W.2d at 389).
139. Id.
140. Id. Assuming, arguendo, that the majority was correct in requiring additional
prejudice, the dissent argued that prejudice in this case was amply shown. Id. The
prejudice, according to the dissent, was present because Andrew, as gamishor, "stands
in the shoes of the judgment debtor," i.e., Todd. Therefore, because Todd was
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Addressing the majority's interpretation of the household exclusion in the
automobile policy, the dissent disagreed that the policy was "devoid of
ambiguity." 4' Rather, there were two ways a court could read the exclusion at
issue.'4 Although the dissent impliedly recognized the majority's reading of the
exclusion as permissible, they reasoned that a more restrictive construction is
preferred. 43 That construction excludes coverage for injuries to "1) any insured
residing in the insured's household and 2) any member of an insured's family
residing in the insured's household.'"" Following this interpretation, the dissent
applied Missouri Supreme Court precedent to find that Andrew was not excluded
under the automobile policy.
V. COMAMNT
Confusion of the doctrines of waiver and estoppel, although frustrating for
the retentive advocate, has served as a tool for courts that want to justify
particular pro-insured results in insurance cases."" In Shahan, however, the
prejudiced, prejudice to Andrew was also established. Id. at 538 (quoting Wenneker v.
Physicians Multispecialty Group, 814 S.W.2d 294,296 (Mo. 1991)). The dissent gave
two reasons why Todd was prejudiced by State Farm's actions: (1) State Farm took over
Todd's defense with knowledge of facts that would give rise to noncoverage without a
reservation of rights, and (2) State Farm's abrupt eve-of-trial withdrawal left Todd with
representation that was only "secondary." Id at 537-38.
141. Id. at 539.
142. Id
143. Id ("Since exclusions are construed narrowly, in favor of coverage, the more
restrictive of the two possible constructions applies.").
144. Id. (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ballmer, 899 S.W.2d 523, 525
(Mo. 1995)). In Ballmer, discussed previously, the Missouri Supreme Court, interpreting
identical policy language, held that "the insured" referred to "the specific category of
'insured' that applies to the situation." Ballmer, 899 S.W.2d at 526; see supra notes 101-
07 and accompanying text. In the case at issue, "the insured" vas Todd (as a permissive
user); because Andrew did not live with Todd, under the dissent's analysis, Andrew was
not excluded from coverage. See Shahan v. Shahan, 988 S.NV.2d 529, 539 (Mo. 1999).
The majority, however, argued that Ballmer did not apply. Id. at 535-36. Under the
majority's interpretation Andrew was not excluded because he was residing in "the
insured's" house; rather, Andrew was excluded because he was "any insured" as defined
in the policy. Id. at 535. Nothing in Ballmer, the majority reasoned, limited the
exclusion to the household of the specific category of insured that applies to the situation.
Id. at 536.
145. See generally JERRY, supra note 2, § 25E(a), at 147-49 ("IT]he application of
the doctrines of waiver and estoppel is basically left to the discretion of judges.
Accordingly, these doctrines are powerful tools for courts to use in their efforts to
regulate the business of insurance."). See also KEETON & WIDss, supra note 2, § 6.1,
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Missouri Supreme Court applied the law of waiver and estoppel in a way that is
adverse to insureds. Using an analysis that, on its face, seems to benefit
insureds," the majority destroyed the presumption of prejudice (or presumption
of implied waiver) that had long protected policyholders. The following
comment will demonstrate the importance of the court's analysis by illustrating
an avenue the court could have chosen and examining Shahan's effect on
Missouri precedent.
Generally, a court cannot create coverage through waiver or estoppel.'47
Missouri purports to follow this principle. 48 In Shahan, State Farm faced
arguments from Andrew involving waiver and estoppel because State Farm was
trying to establish that Andrew could not recover under the household
exclusion. 149 However, defenses based on policy exclusions go to coverage.
Under the approach used in a majority ofjurisdictions (including Missouri's), an
insurer cannot waive (nor can they be estopped from asserting) those defenses
that are not based on conditions of forfeiture.50 Hence, the court in Shahan had
the opportunity to hold that State Farm was incapable of waiving (or being
estopped from asserting) the household exclusion because it was a coverage
defense. Under this analysis, the court could have avoided a debate about
whether there was express or implied waiver, or whether any of State Farm's
actions had prejudiced Andrew and simply proceeded to its interpretation of the
household exclusion.'5 '
at 617 ("Although factual circumstances which clearly involve acts that satisfy the
requirements for establishing a waiver are relatively rare occurrences among insurance
transactions, numerous judicial opinions declare that the existence of rights which are at
variance with policy provisions is warranted on the basis of waiver.").
146. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
147. See JERRY, supra note 2, § 61(a), at 344.
148. See Young v. Ray Am., Inc., 673 S.W.2d 74, 80 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (stating
that waiver and estoppel cannot be used to extend the coverage of an insurance policy);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. of Milwaukee, 581 S.W.2d 596, 601
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (noting that waiver or estoppel "may bar a defense to a right the
insured once had, [but they] will not create a new coverage or grant a right not found in
the contract").
149. See Shahan, 988 S.W.2d at 532.
150. See supra note 62. There is also Missouri authority for this principle. See
Safeco Ins. Co. v. Marion, 676 F. Supp. 197, 200 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (noting that cases that
do not allow waiver or estoppel to preclude a defense by an insurer all involve "express
exclusions of coverage for certain risks"); see also Lawrence v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 649
S.W.2d 461, 465 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) ('The principles of estoppel cannot be used to
protect the insured against risks the policy expressly excludes.").
151. Because the Missouri Supreme Court used the analysis it did, at least one
lower court has followed the Missouri Supreme Court's lead and also underwent a
lengthy analysis discussing whether a insured had proven waiver or estoppel in a case
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The Missouri Supreme Court, however, chose a different analysis.
Therefore, one could argue that this implies that, in Missouri, an advocate can
use the doctrines of waiver and estoppel to create coverage where it had
previously not existed for her client. All that advocate would have to do,
according to the Missouri Supreme Court, is show "1) an express waiver by the
insurer, 2) conduct which clearly and unequivocally shows a purpose by the
insurer to relinquish a contractual right, [i.e., an implied waiver],"" or 3)
prejudice." Shahan, in this aspect, appears insured friendly. However, it
should be noted that establishing an implied waiver or proving prejudice in
where waiver and estoppel were, arguably, inapplicable. See Whitney v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 16 S.W.3d 729 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). Whitney involved an insurer who had
been asserting a policy exclusion defense at earlier proceedings and then raised a
different policy exclusion defense for the first time at a garnishment action. Id. at 732.
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri went through an
analysis similar to the analysis used by the court in Shahan to decide (1) that the insured
had failed to prove that the insured was prejudiced by the insurer raising the different
policy exclusion during the garnishment action, and (2) that the insured had failed to
prove that the insurer had waived its right to raise the different policy exclusion. Id. at
732-33. Unlike the court in Shahan, however, the court in Whitney recognized that, even
if the insured could prove that they were prejudiced by the insurer raising the different
exclusion, or that the insurer had waived its right to raise the different policy exclusion,
the insurer would prevail and be able to assert the different exclusion because "waiver
and estoppel may not be employed to create coverage where it otherwise does not exist."
Id. at 733-34.
The Whitney court, much like the court in Shahan, however, could have added
clarity to the law of waiver and estoppel in insurance cases and saved a lot of time had
it simply reversed its analysis. At the outset, courts should recognize whether the
subsequent defense (e.g., policy exclusion) goes to coverage; if the subsequent defense
is a coverage defense, then the waiver and estoppel analysis ends there--waiver and
estoppel cannot be employed to create coverage. Id However, if the subsequent defense
is not a coverage defense, then the court should proceed to determine whether the insured
has established that the insurer has waived its right or that the insurer is estopped from
asserting the subsequent defense.
152. Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 776 S.W.2d 384,388 (Mo. 1989).
Although Shahan's primary focus was on estoppel, there is nothing in the opinion that
would indicate an intent to change Brown's recognition that "[b]y stating the preference
[for estoppel], we do not preclude the application of [the] waiver doctrine under
appropriate circumstances." I.
153. The court in Shahan, however, does little to elaborate on what behavior
"unequivocally shows a purpose by the insurer to relinquish a contractual right," or
elaborate on what constitutes "prejudice." The court simply found that such behavior or
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Missouri after Shahan is virtually impossible.'54 In this respect, the court's
decision in Shahan has taken a pro-insurer approach and nullified the general
rule that "an insured, having denied liability on a specified ground, may not
thereafter deny liability on a different ground."'55 As the dissent argued, and as
Brown stated, the rationale behind this rule is that "the announcement of a
specific defense itself prejudices the claimant merely by causing him or her to
prepare to combat that particular defense and not others."' 56 The majority in
Shahan ignored this rationale, and instead, required a showing of additional
prejudice. 7
In states that protect insureds through other vehicles, an anti-waiver and
estoppel precedent like Shahan may have little impact on potential pro-insured
decisions. For example, in a jurisdiction that adheres to a strong reading of the
doctrine of reasonable expectations, a court may expand insurer liability despite
a "lack of enthusiasm" for waiver and estoppel.' Furthermore, in jurisdictions
154. See id. After Shahan, it seems clear that prejudice is no longer presumed
because the insurer initially announced a specific defense and then subsequently relied
on an inconsistent theory. Id. Rebutting this contention, however, an advocate could
argue that a court should limit Shahan's analysis to those situations where the subsequent
defense involved a policy exclusion, and therefore, little prejudice to the insured. See
OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 2, § 2.05(b), at 68 (quoting ACF Produce, Inc. v.
Chubb/Pac. Indem. Group, 451 F. Supp. 1095, 1100 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (proposing that
an insurer's assertion of other defenses following the loss does not mislead a claimant as
to what was expressly covered in the plain language of her insurance policy).
155. See Brown, 776 S.W.2d at 386 (quoting Stone v. Waters, 483 S.W.2d 639,
645 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972)).
156. Shahan, 988 S.W.2d at 537.
157. Id. at 534. Presumably, the majority based the requirement of additional
prejudice on the court's decision in Brown. See id. The dissent makes a persuasive
argument, however, that the majority has applied Brown's analysis out of context. Id.
at 536-37. Brown was a situation where the latter defense was not a different denial, but
rather, was a more specific version of the initial general denial. Brown, 776 S.W.2d at
389. The court in Brown held prejudice was not presumed (and arguably, could not be
shown) when the insurer raised the latter, more specific, defense. Id. According to the
dissent, Brown was not meant to reach cases like Shahan where the latter defense was not
a more specific denial, but rather, a completely different denial altogether. Shahan, 988
S.W.2d at 536-37. Correlating to the majority's requirement of additional prejudice was
its finding that Andrew was not prejudiced as gamishor because State Farm undertook
Todd's defense without a reservation of rights. Id. at 534 n.1. Although the majority
does not explicitly set forth its reasoning, this holding was presumably based on the
majority's belief that failure to obtain a reservation of rights was, in itself, insufficient
to establish a waiver or prejudice to Todd. See id.
158. See JERRY, supra note 2, § 61a, at 348. The strong form of reasonable
expectations reads as follows: .'[T]he objectively reasonable expectations of applicants
and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored
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that aggressively employ contract interpretation techniques, e.g., contra
proferentum, 59 to create coverage where coverage did not previously exist, it is
unlikely that a decision like Shahan would affect the ability of judges to reach
pro-insured results. Missouri, however, only applies the doctrine of reasonable
expectations if a policy provision is ambiguous; and, as evidenced by the
majority's analysis in Shahan, Missouri courts seem reluctant to find ambiguities
in policy language so that rules of construction like contra proferentum and
doctrines like reasonable expectations can become applicable. After Shahan, the
possbility for a Missouri court to use waiver and estoppel to reach a favorable
result for the insured seems minimal. Slowly, the doors to extended insurer
liability are closing.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Shahan, the Missouri Supreme Court applied a waiver and estoppel
analysis in a situation where, had the court ruled in favor of the insured, the
doctrines of waiver and estoppel would have created coverage where coverage
did not previously exist. Vhether the court in Shahan intentionally ignored the
general rule that a court cannot use waiver and estoppel to create coverage, or
whether this rule was never argued to the court, the majority seized the
opportunity to adapt the previous state of the law. The result is a heightened
burden for insureds and the destruction of a presumption that had traditionally
protected policyholders. Although many courts have used waiver and estoppel
to protect the interests of insureds, under Shahan, a majority of the Missouri
Supreme Court would rather limit the application of waiver and estoppel and
protect insurers.
JEmRiY P. BnhrU OND
even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those
expectations."' JERRY, supra note 2, § 25D, at 142 (quoting Robert E. Keeton, Insurance
Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions: Part One, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961,967
(1970)).
159. Contra proferentum is the well known canon that states "an ambiguous
provision [of a contract] is construed most strongly against the person who selected the
language." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 327 (6th ed. 1990).
160. See, e.g., Niswonger v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co. of Mo., 992
S.W.2d 308, 320-21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
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